

Flashpoint Campaigns Southern Storm Christmas Tournament

Player: 15BN28

OPERATIONS ORDER – TF 2-6

1. Situation

A. Enemy Forces:

- (1) The Enemy consists of a Tank Regiment (15 TR) reinforced with the Divisional Reserve Tank Regiment (+) and supported by a range of mortars, self-propelled field artillery, and RW attack helicopters. Intelligence estimates place:
 - (a) The 15 TR advancing along the south along the BA25 and south east along FO19 towards SCHNAID. It is anticipated that these forces will continue to move south east along FO19 and FO10 IVO likely crossing sites IVO SCHLAMMERSDORF, HALLERNDORF and WILLERSDORF.
 - (b) Two Engineer Squadrons equipped with bridging assets capable of supporting the Soviet advance east across the Aisch River in direct support of 15 TR. These bridges, once in position, will take 30 minutes to establish.
 - (c) The Divisional Reserve will likely arrive in the area of operations from 0230h, advancing south east along ERH17 passing through STIEBARIMBACH to cross the Aisch River.
 - (d) Artillery support is located inside and outside the area of operations but likely consists of elements of the Regimental Artillery Group (BM-21 with 122mm rockets), a Battalion of 2S1 122mm SP artillery (three batteries) and a 120mm Mortar Company. It is anticipated that the BM-21 will be capable of launching persistent and non-persistent chemical strikes.
 - (e) RW aviation will likely consist of multiple flights of attack helicopters equipped with Anti-Armor munitions.
 - (f) Reconnaissance elements are likely to be mounted in BRDM-2 amphibious vehicles and therefore capable of crossing (with preparation) the Aisch River ahead of the main forces.
- (2) Enemy units are considered combat effective (at full strength, good morale and high readiness).

(3) **Enemy's Capabilities & Limitations (DRAW-DG):**

- (a) **Defend.** The Soviet forces are combat effective well equipped and logistically enabled to conduct an offensive operation within this Area of Operations. Their key limitation is the requirement to establish crossing over the Aisch River in order to (IOT) establish a bridgehead in vicinity of (IVO) either ADELSELD or PAUTZFELD and continue the advance beyond FORCHHEIM. Imposing delay on Soviet forces will limit their ability to establish a secure bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Aisch River and defeat NATO forces assigned to block the Soviet advance.
- (b) **Reinforce.** In addition to the Commander 15 TR establishing a local Commander's Reserve (likely a Mechanized Infantry Company) the Soviet forces will be reinforced through the commitment of the Divisional Reserve, consisting of a reinforced Tank Regiment, to this operation.
- (c) **Attack.** Soviet commanders will be authorized to conduct local quick or deliberate attacks IOT secure PAUTZFELD and/or ADELSDORF. These attacks will employ combined arms supported by artillery and RW aviation strikes.
- (d) **Withdraw.** The Soviet forces will seek to secure the bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Aisch River. Should attacks on PAUTZFELD or ADELSDORF fail, they will likely withdraw to positions IVO SCHLAMMERSDORF, HALLERNDORF and WILLERSDORF. This will enable follow on forces to push through the crossing locations and continue the advance beyond FORCHHEIM.
- (e) **Delay.** The Soviet forces will seek to delay the advance of NATO elements by engaging at maximum effective range, maximizing the advantage provided by the RAG 'deep fires'. Furthermore, the employment of SP Artillery and RW Aviation strikes against NATO HVT (Tk Pl) will seek to degrade NATO Freedom of Action.
- (f) **Gas.** The Soviet forces will employ chemical weapons; the most likely course of action will see persistent and non-persistent munitions targeting likely avenues of advance along the B470/FO13 and FO24/A73 maneuver corridors. NATO forces exposing to chemical munitions will suffer significant casualties and delay. Soviet forces will potentially employ these munitions in built up areas to deny NATO access; however, this will potentially expose Soviet troops to these agents as well.

(4) **Enemy Most Likely Course Of Action (EMLCOA):**

- (a) It is assessed that the Soviet forces will advance rapidly along FO10 and FO19 to the Aisch River and look to establish crossing points IVO WILLERSDORF and HALLERNDORF. These advances will be

supported by reconnaissance elements that push forward to the eastern bank of the Aisch River seeking to identify and call in fire on NATO reconnaissance elements. The Mechanized Infantry Companies supported by tanks and anti-armor will provide direct fire support covering the engineers. Artillery will conduct a range of 'deep fires', smoke and target of opportunity fire missions to support the crossing operation.

- (b) With bridges deployed NLT 0300h, the 15 TR elements will advance north-east along SI2264 through SCHLAMMERSDORF and move to secure PAUTZFELD ahead of the arrival of NATO forces.
- (c) Remaining 15 TR reconnaissance elements will move east into the wooded feature in order to screen the flanks of the two advancing elements.
- (d) It is anticipated that Soviets will hold a Mechanized Infantry Company in reserve for each advancing element. The destruction of a Tank Company will likely trigger the commitment of the reserve to ensure Soviet forces maintain the momentum and concentrate combat power at the decisive point (PAUTZFELD and ADELSDORF) on each flank.

(5) **Enemy's Most Dangerous Course of Action:**

- (a) One element of the Soviet forces will advance rapidly along the FO19 to the Aisch River to establish a crossing site IVO HALLERNSDORF. A second element will advance cross country to the Aisch River to establish a crossing site IVO SCHLAMMERSDORF. These advances will be supported by reconnaissance elements that push forward to the eastern bank of the Aisch River seeking to identify and call in fire on NATO reconnaissance elements. The Mechanized Infantry Companies supported by tanks and anti-armor will provide direct fire support covering the engineers. Artillery will conduct a range of 'deep fires', smoke and target of opportunity fire missions to support the crossing operation. The Regimental Artillery Group will focus chemical munitions on choke points on the B470/FO13 and FO24/A73 maneuver corridors in order to attrite and impose delay on NATO forces. These fires will be at the expense of providing smoke to cover the crossing sites.
- (b) With bridges established NLT 0300h, the 15 TR will rapidly advance along SI2264 and FO24 IOT secure PAUTZFELD and establish an engagement area in the south east covering the most likely avenue of advance for NATO forces.
- (c) The Divisional Reserve, supported by reconnaissance and anti-armor elements of 15 TR will advance south-west and secure WILLERSDORF. These forces will establish an engagement area to the south west covering the most likely avenue of advance for NATO forces.

- (d) Remaining 15 TR reconnaissance elements will move east into the wooded feature in order to screen the flanks of the two advancing elements.
- (e) It is anticipated that Soviets will hold a Mechanized Infantry Company in reserve for each advancing element. The destruction of a Tank Company will likely trigger the commitment of the reserve to ensure Soviet forces maintain the momentum and concentrate combat power at the decisive point (PAUTZFELD and WILLERSDORF) on each flank.
- (f) As part of this course of action the Soviet Commander will seek to bait the NATO forces to advance, ideally piecemeal, towards the massed combat power of 15 TR and the Divisional Reserve. As this battle will likely take place after daylight the technological advantage held by NATO forces in terms of sensors and sights will be negated. The identification and destruction of key elements of the NATO force, in particular multiple tank platoons, will trigger a further Soviet advance to the south west to secure ADELSDORF or advance south east to cut the NATO lines of communication between Bamberg and Nurnberg.

B. Friendly Forces

- (1) **Higher Commander's Mission & Intent.** The 1st Armored Division, as part of the NATO force, is seeking to prevent the 39th Motor Rifle Division from advancing and establishing multiple bridgeheads between it and the other NATO formations opposing the Soviets. 15 TR, 39 MRD, is poised to advance on the key NATO communication hub at FORCEHHEIM and cut the link between BAMBERG and NURNBURG.
- (2) **Adjacent Units.** No information available in the scenario.
- (3) **Supporting Units.** 2-1 Field Artillery Battalion will be allocated in direct support from 0245h (batteries are online at 0245h, 0300h, and 0330h). Fixed wing aviation support (two flights of A-10 aircraft) is allocated in direct support from 0330h (online at 0330h and 0400h). Two sections of AH-64 helicopters are allocated in direct support from 0300h and 0330h; one flight will depart at 0400h.

C. Attachments/Detachments:

- (1) **Attachments:** Nil
- (2) **Detachments:** Nil

D. Civil/Terrain considerations.

- (1) **Civilians.** Civilians have largely evacuated the region in anticipation of the Soviet advance. Where civilians are present, in the region, they are sympathetic to NATO forces and hostile to Soviet forces; however, their

insignificant numbers, lack the equipment and training limits their ability to influence the Soviet force's freedom of action.

- (2) **Terrain.** The area of operations is dominated by a large densely wooded area with several spot height features, which extends to SCHLAMMERSDORF in the North, BUCKENHOFEN in the East, HEROLDSBACH/POPPENDORF in the South and ADELSDORF in the South West. This area provides an excellent opportunity for NATO reconnaissance elements to infiltrate into the area of operations and observe potential Soviet Assault River Crossings. As visibility improves closer to dawn the spot features will potentially provide visibility onto the maneuver corridors located in the valleys surrounding the wooded region. Soviet forces will need to clear the wooded feature IVO HALLERNDORF, SCHLAMMERSDORF and PAUTZFELD IOT secure a bridgehead to the east of the Aisch River.
- (3) With respect to the Soviet advance on the eastern bank of the Aisch River, the following are key observations:
 - (a) FO10 and FO19 provide the most likely avenue of enemy advance towards potential crossing sites. Lateral movement between the crossing sites is enabled by the FO45 road. While providing a high mobility corridor these roads also provide an opportunity for NATO artillery strikes to target units prior to crossing the Aisch River. Opting for cross country routes will delay the Soviet advance. If NATO reconnaissance units are unable to detect the location of Soviet units blind barrages at key choke points may yield disproportional results.
 - (b) The arrival of the Divisional Reserve will likely be via the ERH17 corridor. This road moves east through STIEBARMBACH to the vicinity of the crossing sites passing through several wooded areas. This presents a potential opportunity target for A10 strikes or artillery.
 - (c) The densely wooded area to the north west of the area of operations (IVO B505) is likely to be the location of enemy SP artillery, headquarters and FARP. Maintaining the ability to conduct fires (on-call artillery/on-call air strikes) as artillery and headquarter elements are detected will degrade the Soviet Command Cycle and offensive support.
- (4) With respect to the Soviet advance on the eastern bank of the Aisch River, the following are key observations:
 - (a) The western approaches to PAUTZFELD are dominated by the open terrain to the north of the wooded feature and the limited maneuver corridor along the SI2264 and FO24 roads. The deployment of NATO forces to the south of PAUTZFELD provides a good opportunity to engage and destroy key Soviet elements before they can enter the built up area of PAUTZFELD. Additionally, the Regnitz River to the North East of PAUTZFELD provides a suitable location for an infantry based

force to continue to attrite Soviet elements that do manage to enter PAUTZFELD.

- (b) The maneuver corridor between SCHLAMMERSDORF and WILLERSDORF provides the Soviets with a single, relatively narrow, avenue of approach (SI2264). This opens up IVO WILLERSDORF but narrows again opposite HAID with woods and water features. This area to the east of HAID represents an choke point for the Soviet advance on ADELSDORF and a suitable ambush location for forces infiltrated west through the wooded feature supported by attack by fire from vicinity of ADELSDORF.
- (5) With respect to NATO forces, the following key observations apply:
- (a) The Fo24 corridor provides the opportunity for a rapid advance towards PAUTZFELD; however, it passes through several built-up areas, is bordered on the west by woods and East by the Regnitz River. The limited maneuver space in this corridor provides an excellent opportunity to impose delay upon the NATO forces through the employment of Regimental Artillery Group strikes, including Chemical strikes. The A73 provides an easier avenue of approach; however, destroyed bridges make this a less direct route to PAUTZFELD; this route is more suited to the Commander's Reserve force. These routes are likely to be interdicted by chemical strikes.
 - (b) The alternate routes to advance north towards PAUTZFELD include moving through the wooded feature with the additional advantage of cover and concealment offsetting the slower advance. Additionally, moving east along the B470 through WEILERSBACH then moving north west IVO KAUERENHOFEN provides the ability approach PAUTZFELD from the north east an unlikely axis of advance from the Soviet perspective.
 - (c) The B470 maneuver corridor features a secondary route (Fo13) which enhances ability of NATO forces to advance towards ADELSDORF. The primary road system is bordered to the North by woods and a sparsely wooded area to its south which opens up to farming land on the outskirts of ADELSDORF. The Fo13 road passes through a number of built up areas and to the west of POPPENDORF is bordered to the South by a narrow river (Hitenbach River). This route generally provides increased maneuver space with only limited sections passing through densely wooded areas. The most likely Soviet action will be to employ chemical munitions IVO the FO12/B470 junction.
 - (d) The alternate route to ADELSDORF leverages the EHR5 corridor to the south as an unlikely axis of advance protecting the armored column from RAG fires and chemical effects. Additionally, this will be supported with a move through the wooded feature by a Mechanized Infantry Company which will set an ambush to the east of the SI2264 corridor.

- (e) The approach North East from ADELSDORF through WILLERSDORF, HALLERNDORF to SCHLAMMERSDORF is limited to the Eastern side of the Aisch River along the SI2264. Bridges along the Aisch River have been destroyed although amphibious vehicles can traverse the Aisch River. NATO forces advancing along this route will be exposed at choke points particularly to the East of HAID and North of WILLERSDORF.
- (4) The area to the North East of OESDORF and North West of WIMMELBACH present a potential location for 81mm SP Artillery.
- (5) **Bridges.** Throughout the area of operations a number of bridges have been destroyed to impose delays on advancing forces along both the Fo24/A73 and the SI2264 maneuver corridors.

2. **Mission**

The TF 2-6 is to secure PAUTZFELD and ADELSDORF NLT 0600h 21 Jul 1989 IOT prevent the 39th MRD from being able to establish a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Aisch River and advance south towards FORCHHEIM.

3. **Execution**

A. **Commander's Intent**

- (1) **Purpose.** TF 2-6 is to advance IVO PAUTZFELD and ADELSDORF to prevent the 39th MRD's advance east of the Aisch River. This will disrupt the ability of the Soviet forces to push further south towards FORCHHEIM and preserve the ANTO lines of communication between BAMBERG and NURNBERG.
- (2) **Method.** It is assessed that the enemy center of gravity is their ability to amass available combat power in time and space to secure PAUTZFELD and ADELSDORF with the ability to continue the advance. This will be enabled through the effective employment of deep fires and chemical strikes to attrite and delay NATO forces, the rapid establishment of crossing sites to enable the deployment of mechanized force elements to key locations (IVO ADELSDORF and PAUTZFELD), detecting and neutralizing NATO reconnaissance elements, the use of offensive support to engage and destroy HVT and maintaining a strong counter attack force. The actions are enhanced with the presence of RW aviation assets and Ground Search Radar. TF2-6 will target the following Critical Vulnerabilities:
 - (a) **Bridging assets.** The establishment of two observation posts will seek to detect the Soviet engineer bridging assets to confirm the location of the crossing sites and enable offensive fire support on these locations. The destruction of these assets prior to be deployment of the bridges will severely hamper the ability of Soviet forces to rapidly advance to the east and south west of the Aisch River. Targeting the approaches to

the crossing points will potentially catch Soviet forces moving in the open when they are vulnerable to artillery strikes / direct fire.

- (b) **Headquarters and Support Area.** The A-10 aircraft and SP artillery provide NATO with the ability to conduct targeted strikes against headquarter and other support elements concentrated on the western bank of the Aisch River. Destruction of these assets will reduce the effectiveness of the Soviet Command Cycle and degrade their offensive support.
- (3) The TF 2-6 Decisive Events are: to delay the Soviet forces advance along the SI2264 and Fo24 maneuver corridors. Decisively engage and destroy Soviet forces moving north along Fo24 in Engagement Area FREEDOM and forces moving along SI2264 in Engagement Area EAGLE. Draw out Soviet reserves on ground of our choosing IVO PAUTZFELD/ADELSDORF where they will be fixed and destroyed.
- (4) **Endstate.** TF 2-6 has successfully secured PAUTZFELD and ADELSDORF, destroyed or dislocated Soviet forces east of the Aisch River and prevented the establishment of a Soviet bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Aisch River delaying further 39th MRD advances IVO FORCHHEIM.

B. Concept of the Operations

(1) **Scheme of Maneuver.** This operation will be conducted in three phases, as follows:

- (a) **Phase 1. Advance to PAUTZFELD and ADELSDORF.** In this phase:
 - (1) The screen will operate within the wooded feature IVO WILLERSDORF, HALLERNDORF and SCHLAMMERSDORF IOT detect crossing locations.
 - (2) The observation post IVO WILLERSDORF will seek to confirm the presence of Soviet bridging before withdrawing South through HAID.
 - (3) The observation post IVO HAGELSTEIN will establish an air defence zone to support the advance of TF HAWK through RETTEN and KAUERENHOFEN and deny air approaches to the north east of PAUTZFELD.
 - (4) **TF LION** (1x ARMD HQ 2x ARMD PL, 2 x MECH INF PL, 1 x AD SECT and 2 x AVN (when available)). Advance rapidly along designated route.
 - (5) **TF CONDOR** (1 x MECH INF HQ, 3 x MECH INF PL, 2 x A-ARMD PL and 1 x AD SECT). Advance rapidly along designated routes.

- (6) **TF BEAR** (1x MECH INF HQ, 1 x ARMD PL and 1x MECH INF PL). Advance rapidly along designated route.
 - (7) **TF HAWK** (1 x MECH INF HQ, 3 x MECH INF PL, 1 x A-ARMD PL and 2 x AD SECT). Advance rapidly along designated routes.
 - (8) **1 FA BN.** BPT provide indirect fires on order.
 - (9) **FW Aviation.** BPT provide air strikes on order once on station.
- (b) **Phase 2. Secure PAUTZFELD and ADELSDORF.** This phase will commence once the first task force crosses their respective phase line. In this phase:
- (1) The screen will continue to operate within the wooded feature IVO WILLERSDORF, HALLERNDORF and SCHLAMMERSDORF IOT detect Soviet unit locations.
 - (2) The observation post IVO WILLERSDORF will withdraw South through HAID moving to a defensive position to the north west of ADELSDORF.
 - (3) The observation post IVO HAGELSTEIN reverts to the command of TF HAWK and continues to operate an air defense zone to support the advance of TF HAWK and deny air approaches to the north east of PAUTZFELD.
 - (4) **TF LION.** Advance rapidly along designated route; on reaching Phase Line RED adopt deliberate movement to designated defensive positions. Engage Soviet forces advancing into EA BRAVE.
 - (5) **TF CONDOR.** Advance rapidly along designated route; on reaching Phase Line RED adopt deliberate movement to designated defensive positions. Engage Soviet forces advancing into EA BRAVE.
 - (6) **TF BEAR.** Advance rapidly along designated route; on reaching Phase Line WHITE adopt deliberate movement to designated defensive positions. Engage Soviet forces advancing into EA FREEDOM.
 - (7) **TF HAWK.** Advance rapidly along designated routes; on reaching Phase Line BLUE adopt deliberate movement to designated defensive positions. Engage Soviet forces advancing into EA FREEDOM.
 - (8) **1 FA BN.** BPT provide indirect fires on order IAW the Fire Plan.

- (9) **FW Aviation.** BPT provide air strikes on order once on station.
- (c) **Phase 3. Exploitation.** This phase will commence on order. In this phase:
 - (1) The screen will continue to operate within the wooded feature IVO WILLERSDORF, HALLERNDORF and SCHLAMMERSDORF IOT detect Soviet unit locations.
 - (2) The observation post IVO WILLERSDORF has occupied a defensive position to the north west of ADELSDORF and is prepared to support a NATO advance to WILLERSDORF.
 - (3) **TF LION.** Engage and destroy Soviet forces in EA BRAVE and BPT advance to WILLERSDORF.
 - (4) **TF CONDOR.** Engage and destroy Soviet forces in EA BRAVE and BPT advance to WILLERSDORF.
 - (5) **TF BEAR.** Engage and destroy Soviet forces in EA BRAVE and BPT advance to SCHLAMMERSDORF.
 - (6) **TF HAWK.** Engage and destroy Soviet forces in EA BRAVE and BPT advance to SCHLAMMERSDORF.
 - (7) **1 FA BN.** BPT provide indirect fires on order IAW the Fire Plan.
 - (8) **FW Aviation.** BPT provide air strikes on order once on station.
- (2) **Fire Support Plan.** As per Op graphics/in game fire plan.
- (3) **Tasks.** As per Op graphics/in game tasks and SOPs.
- 4. **Administration and Logistics**
 - A. **Administration:**
 - (1) **Enemy Prisoners of War.** Enemy POW are to be secured IAW SOP at unit location until they can be escorted rearwards by Rear Area Security forces to the Corps POW facility for processing and debrief.
 - (2) **Casualty evacuation:**
 - (a) **Pri 1:** Conduct first aid, submit 9 liner and prepare for ground or aero-medical evacuation to Role 2 or direct to Role 3 medical facility as directed.

- (b) **Pri 2:** Conduct self-aid/buddy aid to stabilize the injury/wound, submit 9-liner and prepare for evacuation to unit first aid facility or direct to Role 2 medical facility as directed.
- (c) **Pri 3:** Conduct self-aid/buddy aid to stabilize the injury/wound and evacuate to unit first aid facility when able for further assessment/treatment.

B. Logistics:

- (1) **Food.** All units will resupply NLT 2300h D-1 with 7 Days of Supply (DOS) Combat Rations. The Logistic Battalion holds an additional 7 DOS of rations.
- (2) **Ammunition.** All units will resupply NLT 2300h D-1 with first line ammunition (all natures). The Logistic Battalion holds 7 DOS to facilitate the resupply of all natures consumed during this operation; resupply will be conducted on order after 0600h.
- (3) **Supply (Fuel).** All units will refuel to 100% NLT 2300h D-1. The Regiment Logistic Battalion will hold 7 DOS to facilitate the refueling of all vehicles as required; refueling operations will be conducted on order after 0600h.
- (4) **Communications.** All operationally urgent resupply requests will be sent IAW the PACE plan and as per unit SOPs. The Divisional logistic staff will coordinate the resupply of Logistic Battalion's holdings as required.
- (5) **Maintenance.** Where possible broken down vehicles will be repaired forward through the deployment of Forward Repair Teams (FRT). Where broken down vehicles are unable to be repaired forward they will be recovered rearward to the Battalion Maintenance facility or Divisional Workshop as appropriate.

5. Command and Signal

A. Signal

- (1) **Primary:** Tactical ground-based communications (HF/UHF/VHF Radio)
- (2) **Alternate:** Couriers/Runners
- (3) **Contingency:** Telegram
- (4) **Emergency:** Morse Code

B. Command

- (1) **Location of Key Leaders.** IAW the OPS Graphic.
- (2) **Succession of Command.** 2IC TF 2-6, OPSO TF 2-6, COMD A SQN 2-6 Mech, COMD B SQN 2-6 Mech.

Centre of Gravity Construct

Enemy CoG: Secure Soviet bridgehead east of Aisch River	Comments			
Critical Capability	Command and Control	Offensive Support	Maneuver	Maneuver Support
Critical Requirement	Communications	Mortars	T80	Engineers
		Field Artillery		
	C2 nodes	Forward Observers	RW Aviation	
		RW Aviation		
Anti-Tank / Anti-Air		APC / IFV		
Critical Vulnerability	Communications are vulnerable to Electronic Warfare impacting effective C2 (So What? In game effect already)	Mortars are vulnerable to counter battery fire (So What? Dedicated CBF battery later in the game could be beneficial)	The enemy gains significant advantage from the concentration of T80 platforms. These tanks are vulnerable when conducting hasty advances and vulnerable to RW aviation assets (So What? T80 is likely the committed to the main effort, early identification of their location / axis of advance will allow targeting by	Engineer assets are vulnerable when deploying bridging. 15 TR only has two Engineer squadrons to support the river crossing. (So What? Dedicating a force element with sufficient combat power to observe the potential southern crossing location will enable targeting of this limited asset by direct or indirect fire if
RW Aviation is vulnerable to Surface to Air Missiles. (So What? Positioning of SAMs equipped units to provide interlocking arcs is essential)				

			RW Aviation and fires to degrade Soviet freedom of action.	sufficient protection is not provided. Additionally, the presence of ANTO forces forward will
	<p>Identification and destruction of enemy C2 nodes will degrade the effectiveness of force elements (So What? Allocating a battery to FSCC control enables targeting HQ as they are detected)</p>	<p>Forward observers embedded with Recon elements can be obscured by smoke and/or neutralized through a clearance task. (So What? Use of smoke during the advance to PUATZFELD and ADELSDORF will mask NATO unit locations and avenues of advance.</p>	<p>RW Aviation is vulnerable to Surface to Air Missiles. (So What? Positioning of SAMs equipped units to provide interlocking arcs is essential)</p>	<p>potentially force additional Soviet forces to be deployed to provide protection and delay the crossing of these units interrupting the order of march of the crossing operation.</p>
		<p>Anti-Tank and Anti-Air assets provide significant advantage; however, are light skinned or light armored vehicles which once detected can be destroyed (So What? Destruction of these assets will enhance force protection and survivability when detected these should be HVT)</p>	<p>APC / IFV are vulnerable when conducting a hasty advance particularly in narrow maneuver corridors. (So What? Establish defensive positions with strong Anti-Armor capabilities to engage APC / IFV at distance while conducting hasty</p>	



**15th TR Most Likely COA
OP OVERTURE**

Player: 15BN28

1. Estb crossings at WILLERSDORF & HALLERNDORF
2. Adv SW with task organized Tank Regt (+) based on Commanders Reserve to secure ADELSDORF
3. Adv NE with task organized elm of 15 TR (Regt (+)) passing through SCHLAMMERSDORF IOT secure PAUTZFELD
4. BPT to destroy NATO forces IVO PAUTZFELD & ADELSDORF



15th TR Most Dangerous COA OP OVERTURE

Player: 15BN28

1. Estb crossings at SCHLAMMERSDORF & HALLERNDORF
2. Adv SE with task organized elm of 15 TR (Regt (+)) IOT secure PAUTZFELD and destroy NATO forces in EA HAMMER
3. Adv SW with task organized Tank Regt (+) based on Commanders Reserve IOT secure WILLERSDORF and destroy NATO forces in EA SICKLE
4. On destruction of NATO forces BPT advance and bypass FORCHHEIM



**TF 2-6 NAI & TGT LIST
OP OVERTURE**

Player: 15BN28

NAI 1: Potential crossing loc and advance to PAUTZFELD

NAI 2 & 3: Potential crossing locs
NAI 4: Suspected 15 TR HQ and SP Artillery locs

NAI 5: Advance to ADELSDORF
NAI 6: Potential AD and Direct Fire Support locs

TGT 001 – 008 located on possible crossing sites and main axis of advance for Soviet forces

TGT 009 located in suspected HQ 15 TR location

TGT 010 located in potential fire support location (AD and TK)

TGT 011 located in likely axis of advance of Divisional Reserve

TGT 012 Final Protective Fire (FPF) for PAUTZFELD



**TF 2-6 CONOP
OP OVERTURE**

Player: 15BN28

1. Estb OPs IVO WILLERSDORF & HAGELSTEIN and commence reconnaissance of potential crossing sites.
2. Adv task organized elements along four maneuver corridors to avoid Soviet 'deep fires' and chemical strikes IOT establish defensive / over-watch positions as shown. Engage enemy targets of opportunity with offensive support fires.
3. Destroy 15 TR Regt and Commander's Reserve elements as they enter EA FREEDOM and EAGLE IOT secure PAUTZFELD and ADELSDORF
4. BPT to advance and clear Soviet forces from WILLERSDORF, HALLERNDORF and SCHLAMMERSDORF IOT deny a SOVIET bridgehead west of the Aisch River

Battle Over



To:

LTC. Ramos, commanding TF 2-6.

The enemy has suffered losses and withdrawals exceeding 70% and is reorganizing on the battlefield. HQ orders you to hold position and await further orders.

You and your forces obtained a **Decisive Win**.

You should be aware that Command considers your performance, on balance, to be **excellent**.



Due to the fact that your forces inflicted catastrophic losses (sudden death) on the enemy, your outcome is rated one level higher than it would have been, and the enemy's one less, based on points.

TF 2-6 finished the battle with 86% by VP value (84% by number) of its subunits combat ready.

It claimed **10 Recce, 6 Helo, 62 Tank, 35 APC, 18 Inf, 6 SP AT, 1 AT, 14 HQ, 1 Eng, 9 AD, 14 SPArty, 5 Arty, 14 Utility and 6 Depot** enemy subunits.

Your force took significant losses, 6% permanent, 10% fallen out, and must refit for a moderate time to recover the 23 fallen out subunits.

You may browse all remaining units.

Do not forget to send your PBEM opponent the final file.

Proceed




TF 2-6'S BUTCHER'S BILL

Your force worth 11,041 points obtained 86.3 % of awarded Victory Points against an enemy force worth 11,983 points.

Your force claimed 35 APC, 14 Utility, 5 Arty, 1 Eng, 9 AD, 14 SPArty, 1 AT, 18 Inf, 62 Tank, 11 Recce, 6 Depot, 14 HQ, 6 SP AT and 6 Helo enemy subunits.

A. FORCE COMPARISON, BY UNIT TYPE, AT 0546 HRS, JUL 21 1989.



Each bar represents the number of starting platforms. The dark part represents the number of starting platforms which are still fully mission capable.

B. STATE OF TF 2-6, BY UNIT TYPE, AT 0546 HRS, JUL 21 1989.

TYPE	STARTED	RUNNING	WITHDRAWN	FALLEN OUT	DESTROYED
Air Defence	6	6			
Armored Carrier	54	32		15	7
Anti-Tank	9	8		1	
Aircraft	4	2	2		
Depot	8	8			
Headquarter	21	21			
Helicopter	6		3		3
Infantry	45	42		3	
Reconnaissance	6	5		1	
SP Anti-Tank	12	6		2	4
SP Artillery	30	30			
Tank	14	13		1	
Utility Vehicle	16	16			
Totals	231	189	5	23	14

D. STATE OF 15 TR, BY UNIT TYPE, AT 0546 HRS, JUL 21 1989.

TYPE	STARTED	RUNNING	WITHDRAWN	FALLEN OUT	DESTROYED
Air Defence	20	11		7	2
Armored Carrier	46	11		30	5
Anti-Tank	3	2		1	
Artillery	6	1		5	
Depot	8	2		5	1
Engineer	2	1			1
Headquarter	30	11	5	11	3
Helicopter	6				6
Infantry	41	23		14	4
Reconnaissance	32	15	6	9	2
SP Anti-Tank	6			2	4
SP Artillery	38	4	20	12	2
Tank	67	5		51	11
Utility Vehicle	20	5	1	11	3
Totals	325	91	32	158	44

Flashpoint Campaigns Tournament

Player 15BN28

NATO OP OVERTURE AAR

I made the following observations playing the OP OVERTURE scenario as NATO:

1. Forward deployment.

- a. I opted to forward deploy two elements in this game; IVO of Haid I placed a mechanised infantry platoon and IVO Hagelstein I placed an AD Section. These two units were made independent and were selected specifically, I hoped to gain situational awareness of the crossing site IVO Willersdorf and provide localised air defence to cover the advance of NATO elements moving to Pautzfeld via Fo11. I had originally, considered a Tank Platoon but ruled out the forward deployment of such a critical asset in respect to this scenario.
- b. My assessment is that both of these deployments were a surprise to my opponent and based on the picture below he actually advanced his engineers directly to the bridge with limited protection. Had I not provided orders to the mechanised infantry platoon to withdraw back to Haid it is likely that I would have destroyed one bridge unit (at Willersdorf) prior to the bridge being deployed. This was a missed opportunity but noting how crossing operations are normally conducted it was probably not a realistic opportunity.




Figure 1. Soviet engineers detected on the way to establishing a bridge.

- c. The confidence in placing units forward in the area of operations was based on numerous play-throughs using the computer battle plans within Flashpoint Campaigns. This reinforces the notion of ‘Think, Fight, Learn, Repeat’.
- d. Later in the game these two established positions provided excellent situational awareness; although, their survivability, against another opponent,

is unlikely to be repeated. My opponent failed to engage either location with indirect fire and despite running two units over the mechanised infantry platoon three times failed to dedicate an asset to its elimination.



Figure 2. NATO Air Defence forward deployment (North of Rettern)

e. **Recommendations.** In attempting this problem again in the future I would:

- Continue to look for opportunities to deploy units forward where allowed by the scenario. Have clear role and purpose for that unit and only employ assets appropriate to those tasks.
- Continuously assess the survivability of forward deployed assets considering the likely enemy response once they are revealed.

2. **Enemy Most Dangerous Course of Action.**

- a. Prior to developing the plan for my game as NATO, I reflected on the lessons learned from the previous game as well as my concept of operations as the Soviet player. From there, I developed the most likely and most dangerous enemy courses of action that I expected my opponent would use which informed by course of action development.
- b. While I correctly anticipated the crossing sites that my opponent would use, I did not create a course of action (likely or most dangerous) that saw his main effort weighted towards Adelsdorf. On reflection this was probably a more accurate depiction of the most dangerous course of action noting the numeral

advantage that the Soviet armour had in that scenario and the ability to engage at longer range in that section of the map. Furthermore the Soviet advance in that corridor could be supported with SAM units to protect against attack helicopters and fixed wing air strikes.




Figure 3. Soviet main effort crosses the Asich IVO Willersdorf to commence the advance South West to Adelsdorf (time of shot 0416h)

- c. While my opponent did execute what should have been the most dangerous course of action I was able to detect this commitment of his forces through my domination of the key terrain, subsequently fix and destroy it through the application of combined arms effects.
- d. **Recommendation.** In attempting this problem again in the future I would:
 - More broadly wargame the enemy courses of action to ensure the most dangerous is more accurately identified.

3. Adjustments to the plan.

- a. Shown below is the initial NATO plan and movement orders; over the course of the game I made the decision to make a number of adjustments. Some of these were to take into account elements of the game itself such as delaying the movement of tanks to avoid enemy detection just before my opponent had the opportunity to enter new orders. Others were the result of further reflection on the first game such as the ability of Soviet SAMS to dominate the SI2264 corridor making the employment of attack helicopters in the zone somewhat hazardous. That said while I successfully adjusted the employment and achieved a good result; I failed to continue to monitor the situation and left the helicopters static for too long and they were subsequently destroyed.




Figure 4. Initial NATO movements
(note these orders were not to the final battle positions)

- b. In addition to changing the orders and actions of my units I was also able to take advantage of situations and opportunities that developed through my opponent's actions. As shown below, there were numerous times that I gained situational awareness of key Soviet assets (SP artillery and HQ) and other units. Maintaining flexibility with the commitment of my artillery assets I was able to accommodate and prosecute targets of opportunity. The early targeting

and destruction of the Soviet SP Artillery (12/16 SPGs and 5/6 120mm mortars were destroyed) provided me with a significant advantage for the remainder of the game.



Figure 5. Soviet artillery identified and subsequently engaged with counter battery fire.




Figure 6. Target of opportunity IVO Trailsdorf; the subsequent battle damage assessment indicates this was a Tank Company or Mechanised Infantry Company.

- c. At 0316h, when the NATO artillery came available, my forces had not detected any Soviet armour units. Without I clear target I employed limited fires along what I knew was the route that the divisional reserve (three Tank Companies) would use. In addition, later when the A-10's came online I used them to strike the rear area of the Soviet forces as this also served to reveal the location of surrounding units.
- d. While I had not anticipated that my opponent would direct his main effort to Adelsdorf, by positioning assets to provide line of sight into the SI2264 valley and maintaining a flexible approach I was well positioned to react appropriately to this situation. In essence, I was able to observe, orientate, decide and act quicker than my opponent and subsequently regained the initiative.
- e. **Recommendations.** In attempting this problem again in the future I would:
 - Continue to ensure that the plan and commitment of forces has the ability to take advantage of opportunities and appropriately react to unexpected enemy actions.
 - Carefully monitor critical assets to ensure they are employed effectively (helicopters) and not detected and exposed.

4. **Lessons Learned.** As noted in my AAR as the Soviet player I identified several key observations:

- a. Avoid taking the most likely course of action. Other than one close call my units emerged from the limited Soviet indirect fires unscathed and unhindered.




Figure 7. A close call




Figure 8. Soviets target the most likely enemy course of action

- b. The destruction of the tank companies is the easiest way for NATO to achieve victory. This requires the ability to gain situational awareness and having the right assets available in the battlespace to prosecute the targets. Using the key terrain I was able to employ two Anti-Tank Platoons effectively to destroy 26 vehicles including 10 tanks for the loss of two NATO Anti-Tank vehicles. This combined with artillery was critical to defeating 62/67 enemy tanks.
- c. NATO reconnaissance units are limited in their ability to detect the Soviet units (sensors and sights); however, by not revealing their location too early I was able to use them to secure two 500 point objectives at the end of the game and they even destroyed a tank! Although I do acknowledge that my opponent did not dedicate anything other than blind artillery barrages to winning the reconnaissance battle.
- d. While not something I noted in my last AAR, what I discovered after the game was the Rest and Recovery function. After play-testing against the computer I employed this aggressively with my artillery to keep the NATO SP batteries firing throughout the game generating additional fire missions compared to what I had done with the Soviets. Furthermore at the end of the game the guns still had 60% ammunition holdings!

5. **Observations from my opponent.**

- a. **Indirect fires.** Unfortunately my opponent did not employ the Soviet Rocket Artillery. I am unsure why but this meant that he denied himself the use of chemical munitions and also a significant volume of fire missions. It is unknown if this would have made a significant difference but an area fire mission on the target at Figure 7 would have done significant damage to a HQ and SAM section. On reflection locating those two units so close was probably a careless deployment.
- b. **Moving Artillery units.** My opponent was not aware of the SOP to move artillery after each fire mission or after all fire missions. Had he known this he may have not lost the majority of his guns early in the game. That said his employment of these units post the NATO strike, advancing on Pautzfeld, did surprise me.
- c. **Situational Awareness.** During our discussion post-game my opponent indicated that he did not have adequate situational awareness of where the NATO units were. Often NATO units were only detected when they engaged at distance (see below).



Figure 9. Long distance employment of SAM.

- d. **AD coverage.** My opponent was able to effectively employ his AD assets to cover the majority of his force. These took out 3 helicopters and 1 A-10; it also meant that I chose less risky targets for my A-10s and as a result their effectiveness in the game was somewhat limited.

Conclusion

The computer's assessment of NATO's performance was favourable, but this was aided by some oversights/mistakes from my opponent. Regardless of the result there are still a number of opportunities for improvement particularly the employment of the attack helicopters and understanding the line of sight system in the game.

The development of this course of action was significantly aided by the ability to test and adjust ('Think, Fight, Learn, Repeat) against the AI battle plans. This ensured that the extended routes were feasible in terms of getting NATO forces in position and protected NATO force elements from being targeted by Soviet indirect fire assets (Soviet artillery claimed zero enemy units). Dominating the key terrain ensured I had situational awareness, which was something that my opponent indicated he lacked throughout the mission, and the ability to react the unexpected enemy actions. Overall I am happy with the execution of the plan, per the OPORD; the adjustments made in game either reacted to targets of opportunity or corrected problems/challenges that were overlooked.

While I have increased my understanding the SOP tool, notably the enhanced survivability of APCs when they are hidden nearby versus supporting passengers and the Rest and Recovery function, I feel there is still more to learn.

Final game state at 0546h when NATO inflicted catastrophic losses on Soviet forces is attached below.

